Introduction
Societies emerging from violent conflict often embark upon processes to 'identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. 1 In addition to a range of mechanisms tasked with institution building, legal reform and establishing good governance, these peacebuilding processes aim to acknowledge and address the needs of victims (and survivors) affected by years of violence as a way to restore them to 'something approaching their status quo ante'. 2 In developing appropriate policies and mechanisms to achieve these ends, decisions must be made as to who the victims how groups in conflict are often both responsible for and targeted by violence, 6 leading to scenarios in which 'the distinction between victim and perpetrator may not be so sharp '. 7 Widespread violence across groups contributes to what, in Northern Ireland, has been called a 'meta-conflict' punctuated with conflicting narratives about the past and disagreement around victimhood and blame. 8 Determining who will be recognised as a victim resonates particularly with debate over the moral status of groups in conflict and long-standing victimological debates about the concept itself. The ideal victim is the prevailing construction of victimhood, informing attitudes and beliefs about the victim as innocent, vulnerable, harmed unjustly and therefore deserving of care, sympathy and support. 9 Importantly, this construction directs society to understand the victim as the object of harm and to locate the source of harm elsewhere 10 without thinking critically about how 'we gloss the interpretive procedures through which the term [victim] is selected, applied, and justified'. 11 A dichotomy between 'victim' and 'perpetrator' emerges, which commentators suggest is 'polarizing, oversimplifying, and counterproductive' in complex violent conflicts where multiple victimhood is prevalent. When the in-group claims victim status, the label accentuates the positive evaluation of the ingroup as victim vis-à-vis the out-group as perpetrator, establishing intergroup comparisons that proliferate alongside distinctions of good and evil, innocence and guilt, legitimacy and illegitimacy that speak to wider perceptions of victimhood and responsibility in conflict.
For peacebuilding processes such as truth commissions, reparations policies and other restorative mechanisms aspiring to be victim-centred, contest over victimhood presents a number of hurdles. 18 This article explores the socio-political implications of exclusive, intergroup perceptions of victims in Northern Ireland as a society attempting to build peace and prevent a return to violence, and draws from data gathered from a range of scholarly and empirical sources including community and statutory materials, public statements, media reports, party political publications and in interview. This analysis focuses particularly on how these implications compromise the peacebuilding imperative to develop new relationships between groups based on social trust and mutual accountability 19 and to transform divisive group identities that are predicated on negation of the opponents' identity. 20 Three distinct yet interrelated implications emerge in the case of Northern Ireland.
First, exclusive, intergroup attitudes obscure identification of victims and their needs, compromising how effectively society is able to provide recognition and remedy for past injustices. The second implication is the proliferation of a 'victim culture', in which victims and their experiences are politicised and subsumed into wider intergroup competition.
Finally, exclusive and ethnocentric perceptions of victims resonate with the 'hierarchy of victims', a concept that signifies beliefs about the deservingness of certain victims over others deemed less deserving. Together these implications impact peacebuilding initiatives by preventing the development of relationships based on equal footing and reinforcing division between groups rather than re-negotiating adversarial group identities.
Identification of victims and their needs
A range of arguments support the imperative to acknowledge or 'vindicate' victims in order to right the wrongs visited upon them during conflict. 21 Some assert the potential of such processes to restore the human dignity and self-esteem denied to victims during conflict, 22 whereas others emphasise the catharsis that may occur upon recognition of loss.
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Acknowledging and providing redress for harm also serves a wider peacebuilding imperative to build relationships based on trust and mutual accountability and to address conflict-related were either members of a proscribed organisation or convicted of a violent conflict-related offence. preferred an exclusive definition, and she added that many more were uncomfortable with such exclusivity. She noted that, 'A number of respondents from different backgrounds felt that peoples' community affiliation often colours their recognition of victims', 50 which supports the assumption that intergroup processes influence perceptions of victimhood.
Despite this evidence of attitudes favouring inclusive approaches, recent proposals for an official process to address the legacy of the past have struggled in the face of exclusive attitudes towards victimhood. The authors of the CGP report highlighted the intergroup dynamics they encountered during consultation, perhaps foreshadowing the negative response to its inclusive approach:
The difficulties of making recommendations regarding victims and survivors are many and complex. When the needs and concerns of one group are addressed, another group is likely to be offended. Placing the concerns of victims and survivors within the wider context of legacy issues is also problematic. Yet this approach, which may be difficult for some to endorse, is ultimately important for the health and well-being of society as a whole. When that data was presented to government representatives, however, the interviewee was told to discontinue the project and as of the interview had not been revisited.
Disagreement over official definitions, available data and its interpretation
complicates attempts to comprehend and address the scope and diversity of experiences borne of conflict. Ultimately, acknowledgement and support may be denied to those who do not conform to group narratives of victimhood or the ideal victim construction, isolating them from peacebuilding work that builds relationships by acknowledging experiences of hurt and suffering and restoring human dignity. Denying victim status to certain sections of society has been shown to compound grievance, re-traumatise individuals and guide policies the undermine reconciliation. 69 Brewer contends that when 'equality of victimhood' is denied, it fails to become the uniting experience it could be between former adversaries. This denial or minimising of experiences that do not reflect particular constructions of victimhood resonates with intergroup processes, and contributes to a number of other dynamics which compromise peacebuilding efforts.
Victim culture
The 'victim culture' describes a phenomenon where 'the collective sense of victimhood becomes a prism through which the society processes information and makes their own victimhood and underscore their deservingness by reiterating claims to innocence and legitimacy and employing group-serving explanations of violence carried out by the ingroup. 79 Who gets to claim the moral position of victim is critical not only in terms of access to resources and influence over policy development, but also to 'fundamental assessments of the righteousness of each of the conflict groups'. 80 The competition often underpinning group claims to victim status resonates with the subsequent politicisation of their experiences.
Data from interview overwhelmingly indicates a perception, across political, social and religious backgrounds, that political parties and interest groups use victims and their experiences to further political agendas. The evolution of victim discourse, however, suggests this was not always the case. Early research observed that victims were initially disengaged from politics:
…the bereaved and injured have no basis on which they may influence the political process. They have no political clout, they do not have the capacity to wreck the prospects for peace, nor do they have the power to command the ears of politicians. 81 Following paramilitary ceasefires in the 1990s, the needs of victims came to the fore, and victim work and victim politics 'became well rehearsed and well understood', 82 coinciding with the increase of exclusive sentiment noted above by Smyth. Victimhood became a new locus of political intractability; political parties appropriated beliefs about in-group victimisation and legitimacy to generate support for partisan interests, simultaneously reiterating out-group responsibility to de-legitimise their political agendas.
Political parties established links with victims whose experiences reinforced their narratives of conflict as a way to confirm their moral claims to authority and legitimise their goals. One interviewee described how 'different victims sectors [are] being represented by different politicians, and it unfortunately largely comes down to Catholic and Protestant, green and orange, and that is just the facts of Northern Ireland'. 83 By appealing to ethnocentric beliefs that emphasise in-group victims as 'real' victims, politicians and interest groups may use their claims to innocence as a shield against reflection on violent actions of their own constituency. 84 Those who critically interrogate the attitudes of these politicians, and by extension the victims for whom they advocate, are easily portrayed as callous or indifferent to suffering. The attendant implication that responsibility for violence lays entirely with out-groups further suits partisan political agendas; reinforcing perceptions of out-group guilt and untrustworthiness based on past actions communicates the belief that their policies and political objectives pose a threat of continued in-group victimisation in the present.
Political association with victims also serves as a 'potent theme for recruitment and mobilisation'. 85 Some individual victims and victims groups may see their role as advantageous in furthering political interests, and become mobilised 'either as political alternatives to conventional groups, or more likely, as surrogates on behalf of political parties'. 86 According to one interviewee, politicians 'can play people like puppets -on both sides of the community'. 87 Aligning with victims in the political sphere places politicians in a powerful position to use victims as 'emotive tools' to condemn and punish those they view as responsible for past violence, 88 all the while holding up the mantle of honouring victims. 89 This mobilisation generates support for policies that shame or remove those perceived as responsible for violence from governing structures, and opposition to policies that run counter to the in-group's desire for truth or justice such as amnesties or reintegration of offenders. 90 Whereas peacebuilding literature champions the empowerment of victims, doing so in the political sphere can indeed be a double-edged sword. Politicising victims may instead reinforce victimisation because those who identify strongly as victims 'are very sensitive to particular cues and conditions and readily tend to use their inherent schema of victimhood to apply to the new situation'. 91 Victims who desire recognition may therefore face retraumatisation as a result of politicisation of their pain and suffering, 92 and are often pitted in competition with one another for resources. For political expediency, not to mention the inevitability of limited resources, many will be denied victim status and left with unaddressed needs. 93 When this is perceived as malicious -minimising or relativising others' victimisation, for example -new grievances may emerge. Huyse therefore warns that political manipulations of victims may win short-term advancement for certain causes, but risks alienating victims and compromising their involvement in peacebuilding. 94 Having mobilised victims to strengthen policies that resist cooperation or integration between groups, political parties may face resistance when attempting more reconciliatory policies.
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Moreover, political interests may overshadow issues directly affecting victims, limiting victims campaigns from generating support outside their own political constituencies.
Barcat highlights the struggle of the Bloody Sunday campaign to operate independently of political association with Sinn Féin. Whereas the families initially recognised alignment with the party would afford them greater visibility and access to resources, they began to realise that close association with the republican movement might actually be an obstacle for their campaign. 96 They believed association with Sinn Féin (still seen as an extension of the IRA) was detrimental to their image and alienated the broader audience and support they sought.
Gerry Duddy, whose brother Jackie was killed, 'recalled how "angry" he was at the fact that they constantly had to "prove themselves" and convince people they were not activists working for some political organisation'. compromising initiatives designed to build peace. Rather than supporting policies to restore relationships based on mutual accountability, a culture in which victimhood is a competitive and politicised claim incentivises on-going division. This raises the potential to marginalise certain victims from peacebuilding processes and reinforce divisive group identities.
Hierarchy of victims
Perhaps the most apt illustration of exclusive victim perceptions, the apparent Féin argued that victims' 'voices must be heard and respected, not simply the loudest voices, not simply those on any particular side or those on no side'. 115 Some within the republican movement do, however, maintain that members of the security forces were 'legitimate targets' in their struggle against the British state, which implicitly portrays them as deserving of violence.
These disparate narratives of hierarchy primarily condemn the perceived hierarchy of victims imposed by the 'other side', while rejecting that perceptions held by one's own group amount to a hierarchy. The concept proves problematic for peacebuilding not only in that it reinforces the divisive group identities described in the context of victim competition and politicisation, but also in that it provides avenues to continue placing blame on the 'other' and maintaining a view of in-group legitimacy. Rather than reconciling different experiences of violence and creating an environment of mutual accountability and trust, the hierarchy provides groups with a platform to emphasise their moral superiority, political authority and access to resources. These implications emphasise the need to push beyond simplistic, binary approaches to conflict roles of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' and confront the multiple and complex narratives of violence, victimhood and responsibility that complicate peacebuilding.
